DECRESCIMENTO V - DECRESCERE V - DECREASE V

 As we can see by this table of Turnover by sectors change rate, growing was an exception until September and come from Manufacturing for external markets (+2,3% by footwear, fourniture, paper, plastics, electric equipment), Aerian transports triggered by external markets (+3%) and Retail Trade by big distribution (food +2,1%, no food +1,6%):

TROIKA (TRIGA): ASCENSÃO E QUEDA IV - ORTUM ET OCCASUM IV - THE RISE AND FALL IV

Irish Parliament

The Portuguese multiproblem
It´s much different of the Irish problem
In Ireland don´t exist the monster state
Like in Portugal as superstate

O problema Português
É muito diferente do Irlandês
Na Irlanda não existe o monstro estatal
Tal como se agigantou em Portugal!


A decisão das autoridades da Irlanda não recorrerem a qualquer apoio cautelar após o fim do seu programa de assistência financeira revela, segundo a Ministra das Finanças do Governo Português, Maria Luís Albuquerque, que «os programas de ajustamento resultam» e que se «consegue recuperar a confiança dos mercados» quando se executa com determinação a terapêutica da Troika! Incrível manipulação!

A Irlanda tinha um problema derivado do seu êxito, a ligação aos Estados Unidos da América, mas que teve outro lado da moeda  que foi a sua toxicidade em termos de investimentos do sistema financeiro (bancário). A Irlanda não tinha nem tem, o problema de Portugal relacionado com o monstro estatal. A IRLANDA NÃO ABDICOU DE MANTER IMPOSTOS BAIXOS SOBRE A CRIAÇÃO DE VALOR PELAS EMPRESAS E FAMÍLIAS. PORTUGAL FEZ PRECISAMENTE O CONTRÁRIO E MANTEVE O MONSTRO ESTATAL EM TERMOS ESTRUTURAIS PRATICAMENTE NA MESMA!

DECRESCIMENTO IV - DECRESCERE IV - DECREASE IV

The accumulated homologous change rate of Portuguese GDP -2,4% is growth? Portuguese Economy are not in recession? Crazy Portuguese Government!

Another pont of view GDP 2013/2012 homologous change rate quarter to quarter:

Again we can see decrease. The only way for a growth is the change rate related to last quarter of 66 M€ between second quarter and third quarter (0,17%), and 460 M€ between first quarter and second quarter (1,21%). But we have an accumulated decrease in third quarter of -2.793 M€ (-2,4%).      

DESEMPREGO II - OTIUM II - UNEMPLOYMENT II

After Berlin in July, Paris received European leaders to react against the high level of youth unemplyment ...

Angela Merkel said: «Growth is the most important factor in the eradication of unemployment.» And German Government influenced a big devaluation of internal markets of Spain, Portugal, Greece, Italy ... for what?

TROIKA (TRIGA): ASCENSÃO E QUEDA III - ORTUM ET OCCASUM III - THE RISE AND FALL III

We always defend that public sector can´t have the protection of employment that protect a minority of employees without merite and prejudice the majority of good public employees and the private employees. This is not just. But one more time Government was a disaster in the management of the question (was crucial from the begining and not started discussion without consensus with PS oonly in 2013) and after create conditions for the Constitutional Court make a decision in summer time with few members and with a shamely subjective interpretation of the Constitution, that create a big problem about a great inequality between public and private that don´t exist in Constitutional norms. But off course, Court decision have degree of freedom for Goverment repeat the goal with other way, but Government don´t dis nothing and put again over all public employees after a minimum limit the weight of the cuts. A lot of errors had the Program of Financial Assistance and it execution with responsabilities first of all from Government, next from Troika, next from the former Government and last but not the least from Constitutional Court!  

«Portugal: Eighth and Ninth Reviews Under the Extended Arrangement and Request for Waivers of Applicability of End-September Performance Criteria» IMF (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=41050.0)
Publication Date:	November 13, 2013
Electronic Access:	Free Full text:  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13324.pdf
«Summary: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Discussions for the combined eighth and ninth reviews were delayed by a political crisis and marked by new adverse Constitutional Court rulings. Reflecting in part austerity and reform fatigue, tensions within the ruling coalition led to two prominent cabinet members tendering their resignations. The crisis triggered a government reshuffling, but uncertainty was compounded by concerns about the predictability of policymaking following new unfavorable Court rulings against an important public expenditure reform as well as steps to soften strict employment protection rules. These developments led to elevated sovereign yields, delaying the government’s plans to follow up on successful bond issues earlier this year. The near-term economic outlook has nevertheless improved somewhat, and progress has been made toward the program objectives. Recent economic data signal that the economy may have bottomed out. Remedial actions were taken to address delays in reforms due to the reorganization of the government. All end-June performance criteria and all but one structural benchmarks underpinning the review have been met. Program review discussions focused on measures needed to keep the program on track. It was agreed that, in view of the now narrow path to full market access, adhering to the program strategy was critical to signal commitment to reforms and boost confidence. The fiscal targets were reaffirmed and fiscal measures were identified to underpin the targeted adjustment. Discussions also focused on steps to strengthen supervision in view of the still challenging conditions facing banks and on the structural agenda to boost competitiveness and growth. Nonetheless, implementation risks are high, and political cohesion remains critical. Renewed tensions within the government need to be avoided, as they would delay the recovery and increase downside risks to the program. There is also a risk that new Constitutional Court rulings will further complicate policy making and heighten economic uncertainty. Decisive policy responses in case this risk materializes will be essential since the room for maneuver under the program has become limited. Staff supports the authorities’ request for completion of the combined eighth and ninth reviews and for waivers of applicability of the end-September PCs. The purchase released upon completion of this review would be in an amount equivalent to SDR 1679 million.»

REINO DE PORTUGAL II - REGNUM PORTUGALLIS II - KINGDOM OF PORTUGAL II

REINO DE PORTUGAL (II: 1385-1495)

João I casa com Philippa of Lancaster, Lencastre
Está vencido um grande desastre
Portugal vai-se afirmar
No Ocidental e Sul mar!

Prevalece de novo a cultura de semear
Criar as condições para germinar
Para o fruto se desenvolver
E depois de se colher

E a semente ser de novo lançada
Na terra trabalhada
Com muito trabalho cultivada
Em círculos virtuosos valorizada

E a terra vai ser o mar
Com a arte de bem navegar
Pelo Oceano Atlântico em segurança
Da tempestade à bonança

Ceuta estratégica, conquista primeira
Seguida da ilha do Porto Santo
Da ilha da Madeira
E das ilhas dos Açores do Espírito Santo

Estava preparada sob o seu comando
Com a sua rainha e os seus notáveis filhos a obra
Duarte, Pedro, Henrique, Isabel, João, Fernando
Todos com mais sabedoria que a Universidade de Coimbra

Para Sul estão lançadas as bases estratégicas
Que com a ajuda das capacidades técnicas e científicas
Vão-se percorrer marítimos caminhos
Com tantos, imensos destinos

Vai ser Rei o Infante Duarte
Que a escrita tinha o prazer da sua arte
O Infante Henrique, mestre da arte de navegar
Vai colocar as caravelas com a cruz de Cristo no mar

O Infante Pedro cosmopolita
Vai ser um bom regente
E vítima do interesse demente
Da latente força parasita

A Infanta Isabel nas artes activa
Duquesa da Borgonha na Divio (Dijon) sua cidade
Politicamente muito participativa
Com a sua inteligência e sensibilidade

Mas o infante mais imaturo
Foi comandado por Henrique inseguro
E após estrondosa derrota
Ficou refém de uma batota

Fernando ficou sempre prisioneiro
A anunciar um futuro desastre derradeiro
Ceuta não foi trocada,
A sua perda foi adiada

A Pessoa não foi resgatada
Mas foi santificada?
Não, foi sacrificada
Com a negatividade despoletada

O seu leal irmão
De nome João
Bem o defendeu
Mas Henrique prevaleceu

Que sinistra decisão
Não esteve bem não
Henrique de Portugal
Agiu muito mal

As sementes de divisão despoletadas
Estão agora lançadas
As parcas muito atentas
Ficaram todas contentas

Os seus fatais destinos
Pareciam ter sido rompidos
Mas afinal os fios dos fados
Pareciam estar bem atados

Henrique com o ducado de Viseu
Pedro com o ducado de Coimbra
Desenvolvia-se bem a obra
Mas também a sua sobra apareceu

Duarte após o seu «ABC de Lealdade»
Foi vencido pela peste na Cidade
Mas também pelo desgosto, deixou em testamento
A regência a sua Leonor, tanto lamento

De Aragão, descendente de Pedro e Inês
Despoletou a reacção de um partido Português
Pelo seu cunhado Pedro duque de Coimbra
Que vitorioso não vencera ainda

O descendente do Reino Afonso
Foi mal influenciado pelo poder senhorial insonso
Vontades de poder mesquinhas
Lançaram vento com doses certinhas

Que assim se tornam veneno
Que despoletam a dor de Inverno
Despoletadores da guerra
Que desgraçou a Lusa Terra

Pedro caiu, Afonso V ascendeu
Por detrás estava o Ducado de Bragança
Do todo poderoso Afonso cheio de esperança
Do ainda Mestre de Avis e não Rei João nasceu

O meio irmão mais velho dos infantes, o meio tio
Teve o apoio do arcebispo de Lisboa muito pio
Estava dado ao imprudente Rei todo o gás
Com o poder negativo todo atrás

Quando o sábio e cosmopolita Pedro caiu
Com o seu grande amigo e para Inglaterra herói Álvaro Vaz
Que de Azincourt para Alfarrobeira no desabafo «é fartar vilanagem» jaz
Portugal, muito angustiado, o Infante muito o sentiu

A sua irmã na Borgonha
Se indignou de tanta vergonha
Isabel casada com Afonso V, a Rainha
Tanto sofreu como sua filha

Mas o Infante João educou
Na boa memória do seu pai e dele avô
Mais tarde homenageada
Pela sua acção a ele dedicada

Afonso V da guerra faz o caminho
Com a ambição de dominar o vizinho
Para o Sul, para o Norte de África, partiu com conveniente esperança
Porque o Reino o deixou ao vil Duque de Bragança

Suspeita andança para Portugal
Urdida numa hipotética cruzada papal
Contra a queda da cidade de Constantino
Onde o Crescente Otomano tragou a Estrela do poder Bizantino

Com o exército organizado
Para outro destino é mandado
De Arzila à vingada Tânger
Se desenvolve o câncer

Campanha esta terminada
Contra outros vizinhos é iniciada
Agora é bem mais complexa
A guerra que se anexa

A velha inimiga Castela em confusão
Está em crise de monárquica sucessão
Os ramais hereditários são um tormento
Vindo do Rei Henrique IV um catavento

Aliado de Afonso V tendo como Rainha Joana
Era seu cunhado e dele recebeu a promessa
Que o seu testamento para a sua filha Joana
Teria o apoio do Rei, seu tio, com a devida pressa

Castela dividida em dois partidos
Por Joana e com Afonso em união
E por Isabel com Fernando de Aragão
Com quem casara colocando pactos findos

Com o apoio da tentacular igreja papal
Sim Isabel filha do pai de Henrique IV e de Isabel de Portugal
Por sua vez filha do Infante João e da filha do vil de Bragança, o tal
Tinha sido prometida a Afonso V, mas Isabel recusou perante o abismo natal

A guerra travada na Lusitania e Gallaecia, teve várias vantagens
E muitas e alternadas desvantagens
Mas com os partidários de Joana e Afonso, sob o seu comando
A passarem progressivamente para Isabel e Fernando

Vai ter uma resultante inconclusiva, sem perdedores
Na batalha de Toro a vantagem do Príncipe João
É contrariada pela desvantagem de seu pai, há indefinição
Existem versões de dois vencedores

Os acordos posteriores
Revelam essa situação
Ambas as partes cedem dores
Evitam agora a ibérica união

Castela e Aragão vão avançar
Portugal os seus aliados vai salvaguardar
Príncipes e Princesas como sempre são reféns
Ninguém fica de parabéns

Mas o pior de tudo é que entra na Península a maldição
Por via dos «Reis Católicos», por sua mão
A tirania, a ignorância e o fanatismo sem perdão
A asquerosa «Santa Inquisição»

No início dirigida contra mouros e judeus
Como se não fossem todos filhos de Deus
No âmbito da reconquista
Tudo servia ao oportunista

Mas obviamente que todos
Eram pelos tentáculos abrangidos
O terror, a arbitrariedade, a falsidade
Tudo sem nada que ver com a divina verdade

Talvez Afonso V na sua confusão e frustração
Tivesse essa inesperada e não realizada  missão
De colocar um profundo travão
Nessas terríveis forças de negação

Seguiu outra via o seu irmão Fernando
Herdeiro de seu tio Henrique no Ducado de Viseu
Vai dar continuidade ao caminho para Sul, no seu demando
E com os seus filhos Diogo, Manuel e Leonor muito aconteceu

O Rei João II na sua centralizadora acção
Homenageia o seu avô Pedro com harmoniosa reposição
O poder do Ducado de Bragança é suprimido
Todo o poder senhorial opositor é diminuído

E a partir do Ducado de Viseu
Leonor Rainha de João II nasceu
O herdeiro Diogo que queria eliminar o Rei é eliminado
E seu irmão Manuel mais tarde estranhamente aventurado

O Rei João II bom caminho vai trilhar
Para o Mundo inteiro maravilhar
Com a liderança das grandes descobertas pelo mar
Pela arte de tão bem navegar

Para encontrar uma alternativa para a Índia
E sem todo o planeta dar a volta
Como Colombo foi apoiado por Isabel tardia
Contornar a África era a sua rota

As matérias e especiarias chegavam muito caras à Europa
O Mediterrâneo como via viciada que não poupa
Precisava daquele ponto de inflexão
A Sul de África estava a solução

O cabo das tormentas é em 1488 d.C. por Dias dobrado

E em cabo da boa esperança é transformado
O melhor caminho marítimo está desbravado
Antes que o canal do Suez esteja preparado

Colombo chega às Antilhas em 1492 d.C. equivocado
Ainda sem o canal do Panamá estava tramado
Ainda hoje se designam por índios os chamados americanos
Porque a verdade da História sofre sempre muitos danos  

O Tratado de Tordesilhas do Nascente
Dividirá a Terra em dois até ao Poente
Para Castela e Aragão o Ocidente
Para Portugal o Oriente

O Rei João e a Rainha Leonor
Tiveram uma imensa dor
 Tão estranho e impressionante
O desastre do seu único Infante

Casado com a filha herdeira de Castela e Aragão com futuro promissor
A morte do Infante Afonso vai causar um enorme desastre
João II tenta encontrar um outro sucessor
Em seu filho Jorge de Lencastre

Nascido no ano da sua coroação
Tendo por mãe Ana de Mendonça a Pedro o lembra
E o homenageia como novo Duque de Coimbra
Educado por João Vaz irmão do grande amigo do seu coração

Todas as tentativas de nomeação como sucessor
Esbarram no papado e por último na Rainha Leonor
João II morre pela nobreza odiado
Quem sabe se envenenado, de certeza angustiado

As parcas não dormem
Tecem a Portugal a negatividade
Que vai prevalecer com ordem
E muito prejudicar a Luso Latina Nacionalidade

«Murió el Hombre!» exclama Isabel de Castela
O irmão da Rainha, Manuel, o Duque de Viseu
Vai receber o poder de Portugal no seu apogeu
E vai ser enredado na trama Dela

A partir daqui desenvolve-se o «problema português»
Afastada a Nação da cultura do Infante Pedro de vez
Portugal vai mergulhar na omnipresente dor e saudade
Cantada por Luíz Vaz e pelo fado até à eternidade!

Acaba aqui na na minha opinião a dinastia
D. Manuel I é da outra cultura, a da negatividade
Vai prevalecer a mentalidade hipócrita e pia
Em vez da afirmação divina da Vida e da Criatividade

«Padrão dos Descobrimentos» em Lisboa, virado para Sul. Na base duas pessoas fundamentais: O Infante Pedro, Duque de Coimbra e sua mãe, a Rainha Philippa of Lancaster. Cópia da obra do escultor Leopoldo de Almeida (1940).

Rainha Isabel I de Castela («Anonymous copy, 17th century. It is inspired by a previous work.» http://www.capillarealgranada.com/en/vn/afvn_1fundadores_0018.html)

ESTALINISTAS - STALINISTS

Abschluss des Nichtangriffspaktes am 24. August 1939. Von links nach rechts: Hintergrund: Richard Schulze-Kossens (Ribbentrops Adjutant), Boris Schaposchnikow (Generalstabschef der Roten Armee), Joachim von Ribbentrop, Josef Stalin, Vladimir Pavlov (sowjetischer Übersetzer); Vordergrund: Gustav Hilger (deutscher Übersetzer) und Wjatscheslaw Molotow


«ADN-ZB Bartocha BL-22.10.82- Bez. Neubrandenburg: Cunhal-Besuch- Der Generalsekretär der Portugiesischen Kommunistischen Partei, Alvaro Cunhal (r.), wurde herzlich auf dem Zuckerrübenkomplex der LPG Pflanzenproduktion Woldegk begrüßt. Der LPG-Vorsitzende Joachim Henke (2.v.r.) erläuterte ihm und Hermann Aken (3.v.l.), Mitglied des Politbüros und Sekretär des ZK der SED, die Arbeitsaufgaben dieses Komplexes.»

«Ditador do proletariado»
Que cargo ambicionado
Pelo Cunhal frustrado
Com o ditador Salazar realizado
Com o seu par dialéctico foi tramado
O PCP, monstruosa trama do passado
Que com drama, muito prejudica o presente
Com a sua péssima semente
Umas vezes com a sua greve indecente
Outras vezes com o apoio ao monstro estatal
Fez e faz muito mal a Portugal

Os stalinistas do PCP foram organizados dialecticamente pela "ordem" de Salazar e pela URSS, liderados pelo frustrado «ditador do proletariado» Álvaro Cunhal, que contrasta com o seu par dialéctico, o realizado e mencionado ditador Salazar, que criou comunistas como cogumelos. Tal como Stalin deu força a Hitler e Hitler a Stalin até à resultante dialéctica (síntese) de queda do III reich, antes apoiado pelo Estado Novo e a ascensão do império soviético, que apoiou fortemente o PCP e a vergonha  de 1975 em Portugal, tendo como um dos principais responsáveis Cunhal e Salazar (indirectamente), precisamente ... A falta de respeito pelo Ser Humano era comum ...

Salazar e Cunhal são as duas faces da mesma moeda que tanto prejudica ainda Portugal ... com a sua cultura fechada, dogmática, autocrática, castradora, esterilizante ...

«Só dogmáticos podem pretender explicar a vida social, na sua extrema riqueza, diversidade e complexa e irregular evolução, com a aplicação de fórmulas imutáveis ou com a citação de textos.» Álvaro Cunhal em «Acção Revolucionária, Capitulação e Aventura» (1967) Monstruoso!

“(…)O nosso povo, depois de 50 anos de ditadura fascista, se se fala em ditadura do proletariado está a ver repressão, está a ver a perda das liberdades, no fim de contas aquilo que caracterizava o regime fascista nos aspectos repressivos. Nada facilitava a nossa tarefa, o esclarecimento do nosso povo e o caminho para socialismo utilizarnos a expresão ‘ditadura do proletariado’. Isto daría logo a ideia que nós, os comunistas, queremos instaurar un poder violento sugerido pela palabra ‘ditadura’, que no espírito do nosso povo está ligada á repressão e à ausencia de liberdades, quando a ditadura do proletariado é uma forma de organização social em que há muito mais liberdades do que num regime democrático burgués por muito democrático que seja(…)”  Alváro Cunhal (1976) Arrepiante!

«A evolução da situação na URSS e países do leste da Europa comprovaram infelizmente as reservas e atitudes do PCP relativamente ao processo em curso da ‘perestroika’. A derrocada e liquidação da URSS e a catastrófica situação que foi criada nesses países, a mudança da correlação de forças a nível mundial, e o aproveitamento da nova situação pelo imperialismo para tentar de novo impor a sua hegemonia mundial, contra a luta libertadora dos trabalhadores e dos povos, utilizando todas as armas (económicas, financeiras, políticas, diplomáticas, militares), as ingerências, intervenções, agressões e guerras a que diariamente assistimos indicam que não só subsiste como se reforça a necessidade da luta dos comunistas por aqueles objectivos que foram através do século a razão de ser da sua existência e da sua luta (.…). Nós, os comunistas portugueses, não tínhamos realizado em todos os seus elementos, e muito menos explicado antes da derrocada da URSS e noutros países do leste da Europa análises e críticas que actualmente fazemos. Tivemos esperança (que os acontecimentos mostraram ser demasiado optimista) numa correcção dos apontados aspectos negativos da evolução e da política nesses países(…)» Àlvaro Cunhal (1993) Escandaloso!

«Transformar o sonho em vida» Álvaro Cunhal: o sonho de Cunhal era ascender ao poder em Portugal e impôr os seus dogmas, o seu PCP e a sua ditadura ao País com o apoio da URSS. Mas a Nação, apoiada pelo Partido Socialista e por todos os democratas (nomeadamente internacionais), fez-lhe frente e atribuiu ao PCP apenas 12,5% dos primeiros votos democráticos em 25 de Abril de 1975, nas eleições para a Assembleia Constituinte! O autocrata PCP não aceitou essa realidade democrática e continuou a manipular e a ter mais poder do que lhe era legítimo até que acabou por ser definitivamente derrotado em 25 de Novembro de 1975.

REINO DE PORTUGAL - REGNUM PORTUGALLIS - KINGDOM OF PORTUGAL

Coat of arms of the king Afonso I of Portugal (1039), Iberian Peninsula (1270-1492, 1210) 

REINO DE PORTUGAL (I: 1096-1128-1139-1385)

Tudo começa na relação
Da Borgonha com Leão
De Henrique com Teresa
Nasce uma boa surpresa

Afonso, grande líder sem treino
Funda o Luso Latino Reino
E começa a desenhar
Um rectângulo junto ao mar

Mar a Ocidente
Para bem ver o Poente
A Galiza a Norte
Para dar sorte

Leão a Nascente
Fica-o a ver a Poente
E a Sul, a Sul que desejo
Passar Além Tejo!

Liga-se a Saboia dos pinheiros
A Mahaut de significados guerreiros
Se transformou em Mafalda
Elegante com a sua falda

Não foi a Henrique que coube a sorte
Porque Afonso quase transcendeu a morte
Foi o mais novo Martinho que lhe sucedeu
Porque a Urraca esse azar não se deu

Mas é sorte ou azar?
Porque é que há tanta vontade de poder?
Como a que tinha mais tarde Salazar
Para Portugal sub desenvolver

Martinho mudou para Sancho então
E frente a Castela e Leão
Fez-se ligação ao deles inimigo Aragão
Com Dulce Berenguer em comunhão

Depois do (funda a dor) fundador
Reinou o (povoa a dor) povoador
Com a sua liderança novas vitórias
Mas também se perdeu Torres Novas

Afonso II, seu filho, lhe sucedeu
A três irmãs o testamento combateu
No seu poder centralizador
Foi um (consolida a dor) consolidador

Ligou-se a Castela
Desse Reino veio ela
Urraca a sua rainha
Assim menos inimigos tinha

Já lhe bastava o poder clerical
Que tão pesado era para Portugal
A sua determinação pela Nação
Valeu-lhe uma excomunhão

Na fragilidade de transmissão de poder
Que a monarquia se caracterizou ter
Vitimado muito novo pela doença
Ficou seu filho demasiado novo com a herança

Para Sancho II qual era a esperança?
Da crise que se instalara no Reino?
Do seu irmão mais novo que estava em França?
Da sua falta de treino?

De em 1230 se dar a usurpação
Por Castela em relação a Leão?
De em relação às suas tias refazer
Os feudos que o seu pai quis desfazer?

Das conquistas serem feitas pelas Ordens?
Dos conflitos com o clero e o papado
O tornarem excomungado?
Dos apoios castelhanos e das desordens?

A sua mulher biscainha e leonesa
Acabará por ser raptada e presa
E seu irmão apoiado pelo papa
Virá de Bolonha desenhar o mapa

Será ele que em 1249 criará as fronteiras
Das mais antigas e estáveis da Europa
Afonso III pode ter como rei as peneiras
De ter conquistado aos mouros o Algarve com a sua tropa

Mas Castela não queria ceder
No seu omnipresente amanhecer
Até a guerra acabar no Tratado de Badajoz
Que delimitou a fronteira do Guadiana até à sua foz

Por cima da rainha Matilde de Bolonha
Se forçou politicamente outro casamento
Pela paz e apesar do seu lamento
Com Beatriz de Castela, com vergonha ...

Mas a curto prazo, curiosamente
As núpcias acabarão indirectamente
Pelo território de Portugal fazer aumentar
Pelo seu pai depois de apoiado reconhecido lhe doar

Niebla, Mourão, Moura, Serpa e Noudar
Voltaram os conflitos com o tenebroso clero
Com o seu poder tão pouco cristão e severo
De nova pressão para mais tarde perdoar

Sobre o Reino por via da interdição
Sobre o Rei por via da excomunhão
Que ao devolver bens e jurar obediência
Beneficiou perto do ocaso de sinistra clemência

E a médio e longo prazo da rainha Beatriz
Vai nascer o sublime infante Dinis
Muito culto, futuro Rei Poeta
Plantador do grande pinhal, qual profeta

Agarrou extensas e imensas areias
E antecipou companhia para as sereias
De futuras naus de madeira da terra
No acordo marítimo com Inglaterra

Com mestria contornou
A tirania, a ignorância e o fanatismo
E a Ordem dos Templários em de Cristo transformou
Que os Descobrimentos simbolizou liberta do anti heresismo

Lavrador e trovador
Cantou a Amizade e o Amor
Por Isabel de Aragão, tão boa infanta
A sua rainha considerada santa

A sua bondade para com as pessoas
Acabou por transformar pães em rosas
Assim como evitar mais tarde
A batalha de Alvalade

O Rei Dinis não o merecia
O infante Afonso que o poder tanto queria
Como tão medíocre naquela época seria
O monarca uma descendente alternativa quereria

Foi para Castela a mais velha infanta Constança
Sacrificada em mais um tratado de paz
Portugal ficou com Ouguela, Campo Maior e Olivença
Por troca de Aroche e Aracena, por tanto se faz?

Depois de ter casado com a infanta de Castela, Beatriz
E mais uma vez se ter seguido a matriz
Surgiu Afonso IV com o poder pretendido
Ainda por algum tempo combatido

A primogénita do real casal
A «fermosíssima» Maria de Portugal
Com o seu esposo, Rei de Castela, passou mal
O que levou a mais uma guerra brutal

Transformada em aliança contra os mouros
Que invadiram Castela como touros
A vitória amenizou a tensa relação
Depois veio a peste negra sem salvação

Negra que foi também a decisão
De Afonso em relação à mulher do seu descendente
Perante um considerado perigo iminente
Inês de Castro foi vítima de grande traição

O infante Pedro não deu perdão
Entrou em guerra com o pai
Cujo poder na paz quase todo lhe sai
E coroou a sua galega Rainha com coração

O Reino viveu sem guerra e com prosperidade
Mas com mais execução que justiça, houve crueldade
O poder papal e do clero foram contidos
Os impulsos populistas seriam sentidos

Que ironia que o infante Fernando
Pelo avô Afonso preferido
Se tornasse um monarca mais vulnerável
Que a Rainha Inês de Castro tão amável

Filho de Pedro I e de Constança de Castela
Fernando pretendeu se assenhorear dela
A tanta guerra correspondeu tanto insucesso
Que aos castelhanos lhes deu tanto acesso

Casado com a portuguesa Leonor Teles
A sua única filha Beatriz vai ficar nas mãos deles
Vai ser obrigada a casar com o Rei de Castela
A sucessão ameaçada no destino dela

E a influência da impopular Leonor
Torna-se um verdadeiro pavor
Que oculta o benefício das muralhas
Da agricultura, do comércio e das marinhas

E quando em nome de sua filha se torna regente
O perigo de dependência preocupa muita gente
O seu amante galego Conde de Andeiro, torna-se proeminente
Mas a burguesia, o povo e parte da nobreza não consente

O filho de Pedro I e da galega Teresa como se diz
De nome João, antes nomeado Mestre de Avis
Uma revolução nacionalista vai liderar
Que o tornará Rei João I no seu culminar

Leonor vai para Castela sem final feliz
Donde vem o Rei João I em nome de Beatriz
Os dados estão lançados contra os portugueses
Vêm muitos castelhanos, aragoneses e franceses

Com Portugal estão os aliados ingleses
O estratega escolhe o terreno favorável aos portugueses
A cavalaria inimiga muito numerosa, poderosa, mas pesada
Vai cair numa grande, enorme cilada

Numa disposição Norte Sul é a estratégia bem preparada
Num declive após um rio é a cavalaria aguardada
Que é condicionada a uma colina ser contornada
Até ser possível atravessar o curso de água e ser afunilada

Porque pela colina a via da água é duplicada
Mas muito, muito arrogante
A cavalaria francesa vai adiante
Pelos dois cursos de água limitada

Vencida a inércia do peso das armaduras
É temível, mas cai rapidamente nas armadilhas
São covas de lobo, que apanham os cavaleiros
Que se tornam presas fáceis para peões e arqueiros

A cavalaria castelhana chega atrasada
E também fica extremamente desesperada
Tal como em Azincourt o maior número não ditou a sorte
A vitória vai ser concludente, que tristeza tanta morte

O estratega era Nuno Álvares Pereira
Que vai vencer a batalha derradeira
Está aberto o caminho para a mais antiga Aliança
Com a Inglaterra nasce uma grande esperança


Teresa de Leão e Henrique da Borgonha (Ilustração de Carlos Alberto Santos

Castelo de Guimarães com estátua do Rei Afonso I de Portugal da autoria do escultor Soares dos Reis


 Coat of arms of the king Dinis I and Order of Christ symbol 
Tríptico para monumento ao Rei Dinis I e à Rainha Isabel de Aragão (em Arala Pinto «Pinhal do Rei» 1939)

Batalha de Aljubarrota http://www.fundacao-aljubarrota.pt/?idc=15

«Diagrama da Batalha de Aljubarrota» Muriel Gottrop (Wikipedia) Creative Commons http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/1.0/deed.pt

ZONA EURO II - EURO AREA II

The manipulators talk about growing in Euro Area (forecast of -0,4% in 2013) but European Central Bank (ECB) cut again in the interest rate on the main refinancing operations from 0,5% to 0,25%, with a low level of the mean of prices increase (0,7% in October). Some member of the Council wanted wait and see. Incredible! So much affraid from inflaction by German authorities and what we have? Threats of deflaction from a money to much strong, a spiral of devaluation of the other merchandises! Listen the leader of ECB (2013 http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2013/html/is131107.en.html):

Mario Draghi, President of the ECB,
Frankfurt am Main, 7 November 

«Ladies and gentlemen, I am very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. I will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the Governing Council, during which we took a number of decisions on key ECB interest rates, forward guidance and liquidity provision.
First, based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided to lower the interest rate on the main refinancing operations of the Eurosystem by 25 basis points to 0.25% and the rate on the marginal lending facility by 25 basis points to 0.75%. The rate on the deposit facility will remain unchanged at 0.00%. These decisions are in line with our forward guidance of July 2013, given the latest indications of further diminishing underlying price pressures in the euro area over the medium term, starting from currently low annual inflation rates of below 1%. In keeping with this picture, monetary and, in particular, credit dynamics remain subdued. At the same time, inflation expectations for the euro area over the medium to long term continue to be firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2%. Such a constellation suggests that we may experience a prolonged period of low inflation, to be followed by a gradual upward movement towards inflation rates below, but close to, 2% later on. Accordingly, our monetary policy stance will remain accommodative for as long as necessary. It will thereby also continue to assist the gradual economic recovery as reflected in confidence indicators up to October.
Second, following today’s rate cut, the Governing Council reviewed the forward guidance provided in July and confirmed that it continues to expect the key ECB interest rates to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time. This expectation continues to be based on an overall subdued outlook for inflation extending into the medium term, given the broad-based weakness of the economy and subdued monetary dynamics.
Third, we continue to monitor closely money market conditions and their potential impact on our monetary policy stance. We are ready to consider all available instruments and, in this context, we decided today to continue conducting the main refinancing operations (MROs) as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment for as long as necessary, and at least until the end of the 6th maintenance period of 2015 on 7 July 2015. This procedure will also remain in use for the Eurosystem’s special-term refinancing operations with a maturity of one maintenance period, which will continue to be conducted for as long as needed, and at least until the end of the second quarter of 2015. The fixed rate in these special-term refinancing operations will be the same as the MRO rate prevailing at the time. Furthermore, we decided to conduct the three-month longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) to be allotted until the end of the second quarter of 2015 as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment. The rates in these three-month operations will be fixed at the average rate of the MROs over the life of the respective LTRO.
Let me now explain our assessment in greater detail, starting with the economic analysis. Real GDP in the euro area rose by 0.3%, quarter on quarter, in the second quarter of 2013, following six quarters of falling output. Developments in survey-based confidence indicators up to October are consistent with continued, albeit modest, growth in the second half of the year. Looking ahead, output is expected to continue to recover at a slow pace, in particular owing to a gradual improvement in domestic demand supported by the accommodative monetary policy stance. Euro area economic activity should, in addition, benefit from a gradual strengthening of demand for exports. Furthermore, the overall improvements in financial markets seen since last year appear to be gradually working their way through to the real economy, as should the progress made in fiscal consolidation. In addition, real incomes have benefited recently from generally lower energy price inflation. This being said, unemployment in the euro area remains high, and the necessary balance sheet adjustments in the public and private sectors will continue to weigh on economic activity.
The risks surrounding the economic outlook for the euro area continue to be on the downside. Developments in global money and financial market conditions and related uncertainties may have the potential to negatively affect economic conditions. Other downside risks include higher commodity prices, weaker than expected domestic demand and export growth, and slow or insufficient implementation of structural reforms in euro area countries.
According to Eurostat’s flash estimate, euro area annual HICP inflation decreased in October 2013 to 0.7%, from 1.1% in September. This decline was stronger than expected and reflected, in particular, lower food price inflation, a larger fall in energy prices and some weakening in services price inflation. On the basis of current futures prices for energy, annual inflation rates are expected to remain at low levels in the coming months. Underlying price pressures in the euro area are expected to remain subdued over the medium term. At the same time, inflation expectations for the euro area over the medium to long term continue to be firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2%. Such a constellation suggests that we may experience a prolonged period of low inflation, to be followed by a gradual upward movement towards inflation rates below but close to 2% later on.
Taking into account today’s decisions, the risks to the outlook for price developments are broadly balanced over the medium term. Upside risks relate in particular to higher commodity prices as well as stronger than expected increases in administered prices and indirect taxes, and downside risks stem from weaker than expected economic activity.
Turning to the monetary analysis, data for September confirm the subdued underlying growth of broad money (M3) and, in particular, credit. Annual growth in M3 moderated to 2.1% in September, from 2.3% in August. Annual growth in M1 remained strong at 6.6%, reflecting a preference for liquidity, although it was below the peak of 8.7% observed in April. Net capital inflows into the euro area continued to be the main factor supporting annual M3 growth, while the annual rate of change of loans to the private sector remained weak. The annual growth rate of loans to households (adjusted for loan sales and securitisation) stood at 0.3% in September, broadly unchanged since the turn of the year. The annual rate of change of loans to non-financial corporations (adjusted for loan sales and securitisation) was -2.7% in September, compared with -2.9% in August. Overall, weak loan dynamics for non-financial corporations continue to reflect primarily their lagged relationship with the business cycle, credit risk and the ongoing adjustment of financial and non-financial sector balance sheets. At the same time, the October 2013 bank lending survey tentatively signals a stabilisation in credit conditions for firms and households, in the context of still weak loan demand.
Since the summer of 2012 substantial progress has been made in improving the funding situation of banks. In order to ensure an adequate transmission of monetary policy to the financing conditions in euro area countries, it is essential that the fragmentation of euro area credit markets declines further and that the resilience of banks is strengthened where needed. The ECB’s comprehensive assessment before it adopts its supervisory role under the single supervisory mechanism will further support this confidence-building process. It will enhance the quality of information available on the condition of banks and result in the identification and implementation of necessary corrective actions. Further decisive steps to establish a banking union will help to restore confidence in the financial system.
To sum up, taking into account today’s decisions, the economic analysis indicates that we may experience a prolonged period of low inflation, to be followed by a gradual upward movement towards inflation rates below, but close to, 2% later on. A cross-check with the signals from the monetary analysis confirms this picture.
As regards fiscal policies, the euro area budget deficit is projected to decline further from 3.1% of GDP in 2013 to 2.5% in 2014, according to the European Commission’s autumn 2013 economic forecast. At the same time, the euro area government debt ratio is expected to rise from 95.5% of GDP in 2013 to 95.9% in 2014. In order to put high public debt ratios on a downward path, governments should not unravel their efforts to reduce deficits and sustain fiscal adjustment over the medium term. The composition of fiscal consolidation should be geared towards growth-friendly measures which have a medium-term perspective and combine improving the quality and efficiency of public services with minimising distortionary effects of taxation. Governments must also decisively strengthen efforts to implement the needed structural reforms in product and labour markets. Progress has been made in reducing current account deficits and unit labour cost differentials, but substantial efforts still need to be undertaken with a view to further improving competitiveness, supporting rebalancing within the euro area and creating more flexible and dynamic economies that in turn generate sustainable economic growth and employment.
We are now at your disposal for questions.
* * *

Question: My first question is on the prolonged period of time over which we are going to see low inflation. Is there any chance you could elaborate a bit on how long we are going to see low inflation for and do you fear that inflation may drop even lower than it already is, meaning there is a high chance of deflation? And my second question is: what options do you have in place to fight inflation if it drops even lower than it is currently? I am considering the fact that the main refinancing rate is at 0.25% now and you have only one traditional rate cut left.
Draghi: On the first question, I think you will have a fuller picture in December with our macroeconomic projections. Based on our updates and the latest figures on inflation, we expect that it will extend for some period of time, for an “extended” and “prolonged” period as we said, and we will be clear on the length of time of this period in December. But certainly it is not going to be a very short time.
As regards the second question, I have actually answered this question on other occasions. If by deflation we mean a self-fulfilling fall in prices across a very large category of goods and across a very significant number of countries, we do not see that happening. Certainly, we have one country where the fall in prices is more marked than in others, but we have to be careful to separate the various effects. Some of it is actually welcome in a sense because it shows that there are some relative price adjustments, a certain amount of rebalancing across countries. Some of it certainly reflects the price of the various commodities, namely energy and other commodities, and I will say more about that later. But by and large we are not seeing deflation. What we see is a broadly based and protracted period of low inflation. Remember that the objective of the ECB is to have an inflation rate which is below, but close to, 2%, and there are many reasons why this was chosen as the ECB’s objective many years ago – I think it was 12 years ago, in 2001?
Constâncio: May 2003.
Draghi: May 2003. We can go into this further in upcoming questions if you are interested.
Question: Mr President, could you give us a little bit of an explanation as to why you decided to have an asymmetric corridor now and whether you discussed cutting the deposit rate into negative territory? Second, the LTRO was on the agenda of today’s meeting. Could you give us a flavour of what the debate on this subject was like?
Draghi: On the first question, remember that we are in a context of fixed-rate full allotment in all our ECB refinancing operations. The EONIA fluctuates between the deposit rate and the main refinancing rate, so the fluctuation range is unaffected by the level of the marginal lending rate. But we wanted to preserve the incentive for banks to actively manage their liquidity positions between the two weekly main refinancing operations. This is why we left the distance between the marginal lending facility rate and the main refinancing rate unchanged, which explains why we now have a corridor which is asymmetric. We also discussed the deposit facility rate and, as I said on other occasions, we are technically ready and it is part of our artillery, and in a sense it also answers the previous question about what we will do if we see a low rate of inflation. We do not see one and we do not think it is going to materialise because we see that inflation expectations are firmly anchored at 2%, or less than 2%. However, we want to have some instruments in our artillery and this is one and another is certainly the one you mentioned, the LTROs. We did not discuss this in any depth today, but there are a whole range of instruments that we can activate, if needed.
Question: Mr Draghi, could you explain why the Governing Council decided to drop the downward bias in its forward guidance? Did you not?
Draghi: No, I am sorry.
Question: You did not expressly mention it…
Draghi: You never listen when I read the statement because you are preparing your questions for the follow-up.
Question: No, actually I didn’t.
Draghi: I will read it again. “Following today’s rate cut, the Governing Council reviewed the forward guidance provided in July and confirmed that it continues to expect the key ECB interest rates to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time.”
Question: So you are maintaining the downward bias?
Draghi: Yes, indeed.
Question: Was the decision to maintain the downward bias unanimous as well?
Draghi: No, I think I would summarise the discussion today by saying that we were wholly in agreement about the need to act. But there were differences about when to act. A significant majority of the Governing Council members remarked that there was sufficient evidence of a broad-based and protracted period of low inflation. Other members of the Governing Council said that the incoming data in the next month could also provide further information and so they reserved their views for next month. So the main discussion was whether to act today or not, with a view to some possible action in the future. On the forward guidance, yes, the position was unanimous.
Question: I want to get back to your point that there may be a prolonged period of low inflation. Is that satisfactory to you that there is prolonged period of low inflation or should the ECB be doing something to make it less prolonged? And my second question is: when other central banks have approached the zero bound, they have bought assets, quantitative easing. You didn’t mention that as one of the options in your tool kit. Is that an option for you to buy private sector assets, government bonds?
Draghi: I will answer the second question immediately. We haven’t reached the lower bound. As I said, we have a whole range of instruments that we can still activate before reaching the lower bounds. I mentioned some of them before but, in principle, we could even cut the interest rate, the MRO rate, further. So, we are not there yet.
On the first point: as the introductory statement says, taking into account today’s decision, the risks are broadly balanced for inflation. We believe that we have contributed to shortening this protracted period of time with today’s decision.
Question: The cut in the interest rates will not particularly help the tightening of liquidity conditions and the scarcity of credit. One of your colleagues mentioned the possibility of stopping sterilising the SMP purchase of bonds and reducing the minimum reserve. Did you discuss this or is this on the table among the instruments that you mentioned? And regarding the scarcity of credit: are you worried that the comprehensive assessment that you are now conducting could contribute to bank deleveraging, and so to the lack of credit to the real economy?
Draghi: First of all, we believe that this decrease in interest rates is effective, and we are seeing market reactions to this effect. There are also some more technical reasons why this is effective: clearly, it reduces the volatility of the EONIA because it restricts the corridor. So, in terms of liquidity, let’s not forget that there are still €730 billion of MROs and LTROs outstanding. We should also not forget that many contracts are indexed to money market rates. So, all in all, I think these decisions today support lending to firms and households. Let’s also not forget that they will support the recovery through lower real interest rates. So there are various reasons to believe that both today’s decisions and our forward guidance have been effective.
On excess liquidity, I know there is a whole drama about this, but again I have warned you several times not to think in terms of a precise mechanical relation between the size of the excess liquidity and the EONIA. Let me give you a very interesting piece of evidence: in March 2012, the excess liquidity was €800 billion and now it’s €185 billion. And there has been hardly an upward movement in EONIA if you compare the two data. So, there isn’t a mechanical or stable relation and there isn’t any threshold value; and we certainly monitor this closely. We don’t want to have undue tightening, but we should remember that the excess liquidity is determined by several factors, the most important of which is the degree of fragmentation – and that’s been changing. In fact, some would say that the reduction in the excess liquidity is primarily determined by the decrease in fragmentation.
Regarding the comprehensive assessment and whether this would cause deleveraging: we don’t think so. We certainly want banks that do the right deleveraging of non-performing loans and other non-performing assets, but I don’t think that is unexpected; the markets were already actively asking for it. The comprehensive assessment will shed light on the banks’ balance sheets and that is what the private sector wants in order to be convinced to put money into this industry. That’s why the credibility of the comprehensive assessment is so important in the end, when all is said and done. That’s the ultimate objective, namely to have the private sector investing in the banking sector. Of course, we want to reach many other objectives with the comprehensive assessment, but the idea of coming out with banks that, in order to become stronger and healthier, have to be more transparent, is really underlying the whole process.
Question: Why is a prolonged period of low inflation representing a risk if expectations are still so well anchored?
Draghi: Well, why did, may I say, our founding fathers actually want to have something below but close to 2%? There were three reasons for this. First of all, they very wisely thought about possible measurement errors in HICP data, so they wanted to keep a significant cushion between price behaviour and deflation. In other words, you may well have a situation where you think that you are at say 1% inflation but, instead, it turns out that you are actually at minus 2%. Unfortunately, this has happened before, in other parts of the world. The second reason is that (and this is very relevant now) they thought about the adjustment within the euro area, the rebalancing of the different country members. They knew that these countries are very different. And so, the possibility of having imbalances was always being looked at and considered. Now, in order to rebalance these disequilibria, countries have to go through a readjustment of their prices ̶ since they do not have the exchange rate, they have to readjust their prices. This readjustment is much harder and difficult if you have zero inflation than it would be if you have 2%. That was the second reason. The third reason is that, as we have discovered in many other jurisdictions, the effectiveness of standard measures of monetary policy is greatly reduced as you reach the lower bound of inflation, as you go down to zero. Finally, there is also a fourth reason why you want an inflation rate of 2%, particularly in the current stage of a recovery which is still proceeding: it is proceeding, but it is still relatively weak, it is uneven, it is fragile (as I have said many times before) and, most importantly, it starts from low levels. So the unemployment rate is still very high. Incidentally, it looks like it is stabilising. But it is stabilising at the top, so it is very important at this point in time to have lower real interest rates. I think that is why it is important to have an inflation rate which is close to but below 2%.
Question: What seems to be astonishing about today’s announcement is how unprepared the market generally was for it. I have seen various comments that it was a shock announcement and that it was very aggressive, and it has clearly taken the market by surprise when you look at the reaction in euro/dollar and some of the equity markets. So, my question really is about the communication strategy currently that you are pursuing, and the fact that you have decided to make this announcement today. And I ask you, if you could put some texture on this: do you think that the markets have become overly complacent and doubted the credibility of your will to act? You can clearly see in euro/dollar that people seem to have taken it for granted that there would not have been a cut now, or possibly even in December. And I saw one market commentator describe you as having a pea-shooter to deal with the deflationary tanks that were approaching you. Well, it seems to me that you have pulled out a bazooka or, possibly, even an anti-tank weapon today. Could you put some texture on the communication strategy for us?
Draghi: In doing so, I think I will abstain from judging the markets. This is one of the hardest things to do and it is usually quite useless because they do what they want, no matter what. So, I will actually urge all of you to read the introductory statement that I read at the last press conference. And it says: “The Governing Council confirms that it expects the key ECB interest rates to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time. This expectation continues to be based on an unchanged overall subdued outlook for inflation extending into the medium term, given the broad-based weakness in the economy and subdued monetary dynamics.” Note “unchanged”: it has changed. Since then, it has changed. And it has changed in a variety of ways. First of all, as I was saying before, it is now broadly-based over a certain category of goods: we see that it is now based on services, energy, processed food, non-energy industrial goods and unprocessed food. It has also changed in the sense that, if you look at the quarterly annualised figures for inflation, they do actually go down in September and October. So that is the big change. Basically, we observe what has happened and that is exactly what our forward guidance was saying. So, if there were to be a change, we could change. In this sense, I have to remark that the credibility of our forward guidance comes out strengthened out of the decision today.
Question: My colleague’s question was focused more on the communications strategy. Maybe I can ask in my words: you said that within the Governing Council today the question was not so much whether to act, but when to act, and so you decided to act in a reflex way today, the motive being more to create a kind of surprise and to obtain a better reaction…
Draghi: I see your point and no, that is not the reason. The reason why a significant majority of the Governing Council members thought it was time to act was exactly because of the reasons I gave before. Last month, we said that the expectation is based on an unchanged overall subdued outlook for inflation extending into the medium term. Well, that outlook has changed. So, there have been changes since I last read the introductory statement. And these changes have been judged to be of significance, both in terms of category of goods and in terms of length of time. We can go into further details to explain this but these two things are important. Sorry, you had another question?
Question: In today’s announcement it was said that the rate cut will only come into effect on 13 November and not immediately. What is your position on this?
Draghi: You are catching me unprepared on this and …
Constancio: That is the date of the next main refinancing operation. It is coming.
Question: I just have a question as regards Ireland. Ireland is preparing to become the first eurozone country to end the bailout programme and the Irish government has said that it may not seek a precautionary credit line. Commissioner Olli Rehn has said that it is very possible that Ireland could exit without a precautionary credit line and it seems that the Commission would be prepared to back this if Dublin decides to go it alone. Would the ECB be comfortable with Ireland exiting its programme without a precautionary credit line of some kind? And secondly, do you think a decision has to be made by 15 December on this?
Draghi: First of all, I think the Irish government has to be congratulated for the progress and overall success of its actions over the last few years. The Irish programme has remained on track and progress has been made in many areas. More action is certainly needed in some areas, especially the banking sector. The decision on whether a programme is needed is entirely in the hands of the Irish government. So it is up to them to ask for a programme. The ECB and the other institutions – the IMF and the Commission – would say that it would certainly be useful to have a precautionary programme in place, although it is also true to say that the success has been quite significant. So, it is up to the Irish authorities to decide what they want to do and we certainly do not want to interfere.
Question: Mr Draghi, in relation to the comprehensive assessment of the banks, and you have mentioned that there is more to be done on the Irish banking situation, on Tuesday Olli Rehn said that you have an incentive to avoid, as he put it, “crap on your hands” in terms of these assessments, looking back at what happened in 2010 in Ireland, Spain and Germany. Does this mean that you are now inclined in this forthcoming assessment to go harder on those three countries, banks and their regulators?
Draghi: I think that, in all these countries, of course to varying degrees, significant progress has been made. The rules of the AQR and the stress tests are going to be the same for everybody. No difference is planned among countries. Let me give you the way in which one would describe a successful comprehensive assessment, especially a successful AQR. What we need to establish is a well-defined routine and if we are able to do that we will be successful. A well-defined routine does not make any differences or exceptions. So I think that’s the most important thing and we don’t foresee any exceptions for that.
Question: Mr Draghi, two questions. First of all, you said that fragmentation has decreased in the eurozone, but how much do you think that this rate cut will help credit flow to some other countries that need it most? Do you see it reducing fragmentation further and, if so, perhaps you can explain the mechanism where that will happen? And the second thing is how much is the Governing Council concerned about the level of the euro against the dollar and did that play any role in the discussion today?
Draghi: I can answer the second question. As I have said many times, the exchange rate is not a policy target. It is important for price stability and growth and it certainly didn’t play any role in today’s discussion and, as far as I can remember, it was not mentioned. So, that’s the first answer. But as I said it remains important for our price stability objective and for growth. On fragmentation: fragmentation has been steadily declining since July last year until about three to four months ago. All indices, bank indices, mostly on the funding side, but also Target 2 and other indices, would show that. After that, while we continue to observe improvements in market performance across the board, both interest rates and volatility indices, etc., we are actually observing that this improvement has stopped. So fragmentation is basically a little better than it was four months ago, but rather than observing dramatic improvements month by month, we are observing by and large a static situation. We are also observing many favourable facts here, for example interbank lending from the non-stressed countries to some stressed countries has improved, which is a major piece of news. When we look at the overall areas and the aggregate numbers, we have to say that we are now in more or less the same situation as we were three months ago. So I think this change in interest rates now would certainly reduce the fragmentation and is something that will help healthy banks that are located in stressed parts of the euro area to have an easier access to the interbank market. In this sense, it is an instrument for reducing fragmentation. We are also confident that as the overall economic situation improves, fragmentation will also decrease, because let us not forget that fragmentation began with a very high risk perception, both by the core countries towards the stressed countries for a variety of reasons but also by the very same banks in the stressed countries vis-à-vis the private sector in those countries. And it had much to do with the recession. So as we come out of that and we see the extent of what we call the three uncertainties – political uncertainty, economic uncertainty and financial uncertainty – we see that, broadly speaking, these three categories are decreasing significantly in the euro area. So I would also expect fragmentation to decrease.
Question: Mr Draghi, coming back to the issue of market expectations, you have mentioned that it is your feeling that the forward guidance has been strengthened by this decision. On the other hand, one could argue that markets were caught on the wrong foot by today’s decision and you were not successful in guiding expectations as regards your reaction function. You mention it quite often, at almost every meeting, but, apparently, the markets are still not quite clear about your reaction function.
Draghi: Well, I am not sure, because the money market term structure has reacted very well. Our evidence is that, actually, our forward guidance has been successful. As soon as we issued the forward guidance, we saw that, after the May Governing Council decision, the curve flattened. Of course, there are other factors that influence money market rates. We do not live on an island or on another planet. We had several announcements concerning the tapering or not tapering of monetary policy in the largest financial centre in the world. We had announcements in other jurisdictions as well, and it would be unthinkable that these announcements would not produce any effect on our own money market rates. But, by and large, as we have seen, there has been a kind of mean reversion – a return of money market rates to levels that are admittedly higher than the ones that were produced in the aftermath of the statement of forward guidance, but certainly below the rates that these announcements would have produced. What we are pretty sure of is that the forward guidance has been effective in reducing the volatility of money market rates. It has also been effective in reducing the sensitivity of money market rates to news that would not warrant any change in fundamentals or, in other words, the sensitivity of our money market rates to news coming from the rest of the world of the kind I mentioned before. We are pretty sure of that. And we are also pretty sure that the forward guidance has reduced the excessive sensitivity to news that has to do with our fundamentals. But I would also say – as I have said many times – that we are also fairly successful in controlling the level of interest rates and, recently, the term structures have actually flattened. Of course, it is very difficult to measure all these effects exactly, because there are many other things happening at the same time. You are never sure whether it is your own forward guidance that is the determining factor, or other factors.
Question: Let me go back to the topic of deflation or lower inflation. Some experts are saying that the euro area is now facing the risk of deflation, which is similar to Japan’s experience. Of course, Japan has experienced a prolonged period of deflation, and some experts are saying that the reason for this deflation is that companies put priority on the adjustment of balance sheets and did not borrow money from banks and did not make investments and that this led to deflation. Do you think that the situation in the euro area is now similar to Japan?
Draghi: No, I do not think it is similar to Japan. We have to go back to 2009 and think of what things should have happened since then. What is quite clear is that, to different degrees across euro area countries, the public sector, the private sector and the banking sector where all over-leveraged. Being over-leveraged meant that they had too much debt and not all of their assets were of good quality. So, they had to deleverage. We should not forget that there where bubbles in the construction sector in Spain. But, more generally, it was the situation that in some countries – not all – there was a very high degree of debt. This had to be reduced, or the ratio of debt to assets had to be reduced, or, in the case of the public sector, both deficits and debts had to go down. There was a period of time when most countries actually ran fiscal consolidation programmes and, on the private sector side, there was significant deleveraging, both by corporations and by banks. And these went hand in hand with some other changes in the euro area, especially changes in risk perception which took place in 2011. You will remember the stress test, the mark-to-market valuations of debt, the absence of a backstop for a long time, and the PSI. All these things have changed the risk perception with respect to sovereign debt. All these factors are at the root of the recession. Now we are coming out of that. If you look at the euro area from a distance, you see that the fundamentals in this area are probably the strongest in the world. This is the area that has the lowest budget deficit in the world. Our aggregate public deficit is actually a small surplus. We have a small primary surplus of 0.7% ^[1], compared with, I think, a deficit of 6 or 7% deficit in US, - 6 I think - and 8 % in Japan. This is the area with the highest current account surplus. And it is also the area, as we said before, with one of the lowest – if not the lowest – inflation rate. This does not translate automatically into a galloping recovery. But, actually, it gives you the fundamentals upon which you can pursue the right economic policies. Structural reforms are the necessary and sufficient condition for this to happen. In the absence of that, unfortunately, we are going to stay here for quite a long time.
Question: Mr President, you have talked about an asset quality review exercise without exceptions. In this sense, do you expect some exceptions on the application of the state aid rules by the European Commission if a number of European banks need precautionary capital after the stress tests?
Draghi: You’re referring to banks that have been found to be viable and with a regulatory capital which is above the minimum, after the asset quality review. The AQR provides a snapshot of a situation where these banks would actually be having a capital which is above the regulatory minimum. Then we have the stress tests, and the situation that I described in my letter was about what we should do if a bank which is o.k. statically turns out to be in need of capital – under stress. Would you proceed to bail in creditors of this bank right away? Clearly, the situation is difficult because if you do so, the creditors would run away immediately and the bank would fail, even though statically it was solvent and viable. I think this is a genuine problem, and since then we have discussed it, and we have statements by Vice-President Almunia to this effect. Both the ECB and the Commission are working on this. And I’m quite confident that, by the time we do the stress tests, we will have found a way to deal with this problem.
Question: We have fewer and fewer questions. But, referring to May 2003, if I guess correctly, you wanted to say something about a possible strategy overhaul which was actually due after five years, or is it in your plans? Many people are talking about that. Many ECB watchers are saying that a strategy overhaul could be needed for inflation or for adding another column, for instance, like the role for financial stability of the ECB into the strategy. What do you think of this?
Draghi: No, I don’t think we had any discussion on this point. Are you thinking about an extension of our mandate? It would not be up to us to decide what our mandate is. We are perfectly happy with what we have today, and it’s up to the legislators to decide the mandate of the ECB. We have to, in a sense, apply the mandate and that’s what we are doing, by the way, with the decision today. We have acted fully in line with our mandate of maintaining price stability with an objective of having an inflation rate below, but close to, 2%. That is not to be forgotten.
Question: No, I was referring to the overhaul of the strategy which took place at the time of Mr. Issing and Mr. Duisenberg back then and which fixed the 2% objective.
Draghi: I’m sorry. Maybe Vítor has a longer memory?
Constâncio: I was a member of the Governing Council back then. No, the 2% was there from the beginning. The difference was that, in the beginning, the definition of price stability was to have inflation below 2%, without any other consideration. And, there were many discussions in the media and in academic circles that that definition meant that, if inflation was minus 1%, it was o.k. as well, because it was below 2%. So, in May 2003, we clarified that that was not the case, so the definition was clarified as “below, but close to, 2%” for the reasons that the President gave in one of his answers. In May 2003 we changed other small things in the framework. For instance, if you recall in the presentations of the press conferences in the early days, monetary analysis came before economic analysis, and that was reversed in the decision of May 2003. It was also clarified that, when looking at monetary aggregates, we were looking at a set of aggregates and not just M3. We changed also the way the reference value had been dealt with before May 2003 and it was clarified that the monetary analysis focused more on medium-term considerations, as a way of cross-checking the result of the economic analysis. So, there were four or five points of clarification, of fine tuning of the framework, with the main change being the definition of the objective, which before did not have this idea of below, but close to, 2%.
Question: When you say in your introductory statement that you expect a prolonged period of low inflation followed by an uptick, the October numbers came out more negatively than expected. So what is your rationale for believing that there won’t be more negative news out there to pull figures even lower and going into deflation because you continue to say there is a downside risk to the economy?
Draghi: I think I did say this in the introductory statement. Basically, we will be clearer in December when we have our macroeconomic projections, but it is a combination of energy prices and other prices, the weakness of the economy for some time, so this gives us the evidence to say that it is going to be there for a protracted period of time. And it is also true that as the recovery gains momentum, we also see the possibility of a return to our inflation expectations level. So, we see expectations of inflation firmly anchored at 2%. We know that at some point in time actual inflation will drive back. We now see that this point of time is not next month, and that is what I tried to convey. We will be clearer on the factors behind our outlook of subdued inflation for a protracted period of time in December.

---

^[1]It is actually a small deficit»

GREVE - PERCUTE - STRIKE

«Women garment workers in the early 20th century became active organizers to improve sweatshop conditions. Many of those conditions continue in the garment industry in the 21st century. This image of a turn-of-the-century garment worker’s strike has been altered to include four anachronisms from the late 20th century.» http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5291

Strike, suspension of labour ... sometimes just. sometimes not ... Is the case of strikes manipulated by Portuguese Comunist Party (Partido Comunista Português) they are not just in Portugal, legal but not moral! The comunists manipulated the workers of public companies of transports to create a black mail over the other workers that can´t go to your labour places! All lost: companies, employees, Portuguese Nation!

RIQUEZA - DIVITIAE - WEALTH

«Riqueza» by Soares dos Reis (1877) in a photo by Manuelvbotelho (Wikipedia) Creative Commons http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.pt

«Depiction of Tomis Fortuna, Constanta Museum» photo by CristianChirita (Wikipedia) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en

Roman Goddess FORTUNA linked to lucky, abondance and indirectly to wealth ... here in a representation from the city of Tomis, renamed Constantiana in honour of Constantia, sister of Constantinus, now Constanța (Romania).

The wealth that Adam Smith have tried to understand the causes and Karl Marx talked about two dimensions: the human and the material wealth in him «Grundrisse».

The human material world since XVIII century of the Scottish economist, beyond the XIX century of the German economist until the current century generate a great concentration of material wealth in games like the economic players play after the rise of a new kind of liberalism that create the actual crisis and a lot of rich persons that don´t paid what they generate ...

From the cycle of value we can understand what happening when the social game have vicious trends ...

MATERIA ... LABOR ... OPUS ... VALOR ... DESIDERIUM (SOCIALIS NECESSITATEM) ... ARGENTUM ... DIVITIAE ... CAPITALE ... MATERIA ... LABOR ... OPUS ... VALOR ...  ... DESIDERIUM (SOCIALIS NECESSITATEM) ... ARGENTUM ... DIVITIAE ... CAPITALE ...

Materia ... Labour ... Opera ... Value ... Desire (Social Needs) ... Money ... Wealth ... Capital ... Materia ... Labour ... Opera ... Value ... Desire (Social Needs) ... Money ... Wealth ... Capital ...

Games with negative or null sum. Is not always like that, many times we have games with positive sum, with synergies ...

A negative example is the cartels of petroleum, the principal source of energy at the moment.

The Swiss bank UBS sposered an annual report about the «millionaires» with a net worth equal or higher than 30 millions of USD by country («World Ultra Wealth Report 2013» by Wealth X http://www.indianexpress.com/pdf/Wealth-X_and_UBS_World_Ultra_Wealth_Report_2013.pdf), where we can see:

- 199.235 persons in 2013, more 6,3% than 2012;
-  27.770.000 millions USD of net worth in 2013, more 7,7% than 2012;
- 65.505 from United States of America - USA (32,9% of total);
- 9.085.000 millions of USD from USA (32,7%).

For Europe we have an incredible situation of Portugal that manifest how is possible win a lot of money in a country with historical oligarchies:

COLÔMBIA X - COLUMBIA X - COLOMBIA X

«Colombia has a Food Retail sector dominated by small traditional retailers, with interesting opportunities to strengthening the offering available to Colombian consumers. The Group believes that Colombia has potential for establishing a differentiated value proposition that will contribute to its growth in the medium and long term.» Grupo Jerónimo Martins http://www.jeronimomartins.pt/o-grupo/onde-estamos/colombia.aspx?lang=en

«Na Colômbia, a Ara inaugurou 14 lojas entre Julho e Setembro e encerrou o trimestre com 28 lojas. Estamos muito entusiasmados com o potencial do mercado e com a resposta dos consumidores

colombianos à nossa proposta.

(...) a Ara irá terminar o ano com 35 a 40 lojas. O programa de investimento do Grupo para 2013 estima-se em (...) 50 milhões de euros na Colômbia.» http://www.jeronimomartins.pt/media/530403/resultados9m2013.pdf

(...), a Ara acabou o semestre com 14 lojas, tendo registado a abertura de nove lojas no segundo trimestre, em linha com o plano. A equipa continua a desenvolver o relacionamento comercial com os fornecedores, a conhecer e entender os seus consumidores e a testar o modelo de negócio no mercado. A resposta dos consumidores tem sido muito entusiasta e os resultados iniciais apoiam a nossa perspectiva positiva sobre a oportunidade de negócio.» http://www.jeronimomartins.pt/media/524632/relatorio-e-contas-consolidado-1-semestre-2013.pdf

O volume de negócios da Ara na Colômbia foi de 5.972.000 € entre 13 de Março e 30 de Junho de 2013.